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1. INTRODUCTION
Private parties discharge critical roles in the Obama Administra-
tion, as they have in administrations past.' Examples from the Obama
* Dean & Professor, IT Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank Kathleen
Clark, Gillian Metzger, Mark Rosen and Christopher Schmidt for commenting on earlier drafts, as
well as workshop attendees at Northwestern University School of Law. In addition, I thank
Katherine Jahnke and Jennifer Schaffer for their research assistance. Finally, I appreciate the
efforts of the Law Review at the University of Miami for organizing this symposium.
1. See, e.g., PAUL R. VERKUL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 9-10 (2007) (tracing
privatization decisions back to the Reagan Administration); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 552 (2000) (explaining that the privatization of
government-financed human services has been ongoing for the past half-century); Gillian E.
Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 CoLum. L. REv. 1367, 1380-94 (2003) (discussing
privatization in the fields of Medicare and Medicaid, welfare, public education, and private
prisons).
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Administration include defending Congress's determination to use a
quasi-private entity, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB), to regulate those providing accounting services to publicly
traded firms;2 appointing an attorney in private practice, Kenneth Fein-
berg, to set executive compensation rates;' directing a private advisory
group to investigate and report potential civil liberties violations by gov-
ernmental authorities;' and advocating that a private entity-the
National Academy of Sciences-play a determinative role in setting
global warming policy.' In addition, the Administration acquiesced to a
proposal creating a private Cybersecurity Advisory Panel that could
have vetoed action by the Department of Commerce.' As with its prede-
cessors, the Obama Administration also has contracted out a wide vari-
ety of services and duties to the private sector,' in contexts ranging from
2. In 2002, Congress established the PCAOB "to oversee the audit of public companies that
are subject to the securities laws, and related matters, in order to protect the interests of investors
and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit
reports . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006). In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting
Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3149 (2010), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the PCAOB, with the exception of the double layer of removal provisions protecting members of
the PCAOB from discharge except for cause.
3. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Press
Secretary Robert Gibbs and Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke (June 10, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/briefing-secretary-commerce-gary-locke-and-press-
secretary-robert-gibbs-6-10-09 ("Ken Feinberg is going to assume the role of special master that
will allow him to review . . . compensation packages for those companies that are either receiving
extraordinary assistance or might in the future"); see also Stephen Labaton, Treasury To Set
Executives' Pay at 7 Ailing Firms, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/
I 1/business/1 1pay.html; Deborah Solomon, White House Set To Appoint a Pay Czar, WALL ST. J.,
June 5, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124416737421887739.html; FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT BOARD, MINUTES OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT BOARD MEETING JUNE 25,
2009 (2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/FSOB/FINSOB-Minutes-06250
9.pdf.
4. Exec. Order No. 13,516, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,521 (Nov. 2, 2009) (enhancing the authority of
an oversight board created for the purpose of monitoring unlawful intelligence activities).
5. For example, the President stated in a press statement in June 2009 that he commended
Congressman Waxman on his commitment and felt that this bill was a "historic" piece of
legislation. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the
President on Committee Passage of the American Clean Energy and Security Act (May 21, 2009),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-committee-passage-
american-clean-energy-and-security-act.
6. Cybersecurity Act of 2009, S. 773, 111th Cong. § 8(a)(1)-(3) (2009) ("No action by the
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information . .. shall be final until the
Advisory Panel (1) has reviewed the action; (2) considered the commercial and national security
implications of the action; and (3) approved the action").
7. In Fiscal Year 2007, for example, the government contracted out $268 billion of services.
Kathleen Clark, Ethics for an Outsourced Government 26-32 (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.acus.
gov/research/the-conference-current-projects/government-contractor-ethics/ (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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national security' to claims adjudication.9 Such use of private parties to
help implement federal law raises profound questions of constitutional
propriety and democracy o-private parties help set governmental pol-
icy largely outside the conflict of interest and transparency rules" typi-
fied by statutes such as the Hatch Act, 12 Ethics in Government Act, 13
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),14 the Sunshine Act," and the
Administrative Procedure Act. 16
This article will reexamine whether there should be constitutional
constraints on congressional and presidential delegations to private par-
ties and what those constraints might consist of. Although the propriety
of the private exercise of public powers rarely has been litigated, the
Supreme Court struggled with that question during the New Deal when
Congress created a number of innovative governance structures combin-
ing public and private entities in an effort to end the Great Depression.
Indeed, on several occasions, such as in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. " and
8. See, e.g., James Rosen, Obama Administration Steers Lucrative No-Bid Contract for
Afghan Work to Democratic Donor, FOXNEWS.COM (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/
politics/2010/01/25/obama-administration-steers-lucrative-bid-conract-afghan-work-dem-donor.
9. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-621T, DEFENSE AcQuisMoNs:
DOD's INCREASED RELIANCE ON SERVICE CONTRACTORS EXACERBATES LONG-STANDING
CHALLENGES 1, 4 (2008). Commentators increasingly acknowledge the rich ways in which private
parties can contribute to public governance, whether through negotiated rulemaking, advising
governmental regulators, or helping to deliver governmental goods and services. For example,
envoys are often dispatched to negotiate treaties, secure the release of prisoners, and pursue
similar objectives. For a discussion of these envoys, see, for example, Aaron Saiger, Obama's
"Czars" for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011); John Yoo, Jefferson and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 421, 436-39
(2008). For further discussions on privatization of government services, see, for example, Michael
Glanzer, Union Strategies in Privatization: Shakespeare-Inspired Alternatives, 64 ALB. L. REV.
437, 440-458 (2000). For further discussions of private influence on public laws, see, for
example, Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 383,
389-96 (2006); Freeman, supra note 1, at 551-56.
10. See VERKUIL, supra note 1; Metzger, supra note 1; Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of
the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 427-36 (2009).
11. Congress generally has imposed such constraints only on "agencies," defined, for
example, as "each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or
subject to review by another agency . . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2006).
12. Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993 (Hatch Act), Pub. L. No. 103-94, 107 Stat. 1001
(codified in 5 U.S.C. § 732 et seq.).
13. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 824 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
15. Government in the Sunshine Act (Open Meetings Act), 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006). For a
more complete listing of the ethics rules constraining government employees, see infra notes
266-77.
16. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2006).
17. 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (invalidating delegation to a private party under the Bituminous
Coal Conservation Act).
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in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States," the Court invali-
dated delegations in part because of the role accorded private parties.
When Congress delegates to private entities, the evils of massive delega-
tions to independent agencies seem magnified-private entities are less
electorally accountable, less subject to bureaucratic constraints, and may
be less motivated to serve the public good than are independent adminis-
trative agencies. Moreover, private decisionmaking may escape both
judicial review and constitutional restraints.19 Even after the repudiation
of much 1930s era jurisprudence, the Supreme Court on occasion has
continued to warn of the special vices of the exercise of public power by
private individuals,2 0 and lower courts as well at times have decried the
particular evils of delegations to private parties.2'
The few courts to address the issue over the past eighty years have
used three doctrinal lenses. First, courts looked to the Due Process
Clause as a protection against self-interested involvement by private par-
ties in implementation of federal law.22 Second, courts used the nondele-
gation doctrine, particularly during the New Deal, to invalidate a number
of delegations to private producer groups." Third, and more recently,
18. 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935) (criticizing delegation to a private party under the National
Recovery Act).
19. The state action doctrine at times imposes constitutional restraints on private actors. See,
e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 57 (1988) (finding that a physician contracted to provide
services to a prison is performing a state action because states otherwise could evade
constitutional responsibilities by subcontracting services).
20. See, e.g., Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 130 S. Ct. 2184, 2190 (2010)
(Roberts, J., dissenting) ("A basic step in organizing a civilized society is to take that sword out of
private hands and turn it over to the organized government, acting on behalf of all the people.");
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 680-81 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that California's
system of false-advertising regulation delegates excessive power to private parties that burdens
speech); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 804-810 (1987)
(addressing problems of self-interested prosecution by a private party); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 93 (1972) (holding that a state scheme permitting a creditor to obtain a writ based on ex
parte allegations delegates too much authority to a private party).
21. See, e.g., Hays v. Sebelius, 589 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Randolph, J.,
concurring) (questioning whether Congress could delegate lawmaking functions to private
contractors); City of Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 357-58 (5th Cir. 1999) (invalidating a rule
permitting video-system providers to discriminate among cable operators on the ground that such
a rule constitutes "a delegation of regulatory authority to impose a cost on another regulatory
entity"); Gen. Elec. Co. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 936 F.2d 1448, 1459 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
that New York's prevailing wage law would be an unconstitutional private delegation if the State
did not investigate whether certain collective bargaining agreements were collusive); Geo-Tech
Reclamation Indus. v. Hamrick, 886 F. 2d 662, 664-66 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting, in dicta, that a
statute authorizing the denial of a landfill permit based upon community opposition may constitute
an impermissible private delegation).
22. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263-65 (2009); Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
23. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311-312 (1936); St. Louis, Iron
Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 287-88 (1908).
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academics have suggested that judges turn to the President's appoint-
ment and removal authorities to safeguard the public exercise of govern-
mental authority. Individuals appointed by the President and subject to
his removal authority presumptively implement the law in a public
regarding way, minimizing concern for self dealing.24
None of the three doctrinal formulations, however, specifically
addresses the problem of delegation to private parties. The Due Process
Clause traditionally has not been relied upon to prevent delegations to
private firms, at least as long as property and liberty rights are not
directly involved. The nondelegation doctrine is indifferent to the iden-
tity of the individual exercising the power-if legislative standards exist,
the individual's private status does not come into play. And, only
appointments to "offices" trigger the Appointments Clause-appoint-
ment of individuals and groups to exercise discrete or episodic functions
escapes Article II scrutiny.25 The lack of fit between the three doctrines
and delegation to private parties has obscured the unique status of pri-
vate party governance.
Accordingly, this Article first argues (as have others) that the exer-
cise of private power at times violates the constitutional principle of
accountability. 26 The Constitution does not authorize either Congress or
the President to outsource what I term decisional authority to private
parties-authority that binds other private parties in the government's
name. Private parties are not subject to presidential appointment or
removal; nor are they subject to impeachment. Exercise of authority by
private parties may escape the checks and balances woven into the Con-
stitution. As a result, individual liberty may be compromised.
The Article then asks whether a doctrine more tailored than those
used by the Supreme Court in prior cases can be fashioned. There often
is no clear demarcation between the public and private exercise of gov-
ernmental authority, as many examples from the Obama Administration
indicate, from the directors of the majority-owned General Motors27 to
private members of the Federal Open Market Committee,2 8 and from
Kenneth Feinberg as compensation czar29 to the plethora of security
24. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692-93 (1988).
25. Compare Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 324-28 (1890), and United States v.
Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511-12 (1879), with U.S. v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 393-96 (1867).
26. See infra Part 111.
27. See Neil King, Jr. & Sharon Terlep, GM Collapses into Government's Arms, WALL ST. J.,
June 2, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124385428627671889.html.
28. See 12 U.S.C. § 263 (2006) (establishing a "Federal Open Market Committee" consisting
of "five members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and five
representatives of the Federal Reserve banks").
29. See supra note 3.
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functions contracted out by the Department of Homeland Security. 30 The
recent bailouts of AIG, the banks, and GM have blurred the lines
between the public and private sectors further.3 2 The public/private dis-
tinction has long bedeviled courts and commentators.
Nonetheless, the Article argues that a doctrine can be fashioned to
check untoward delegations of power to private parties. The first doctri-
nal step should focus on what type or level of authority exercised by
private entities is constitutionally problematic. Neither the scope nor
subject matter of duties should be determinative. Rather, the nature of
the duties delegated should control. As the Supreme Court has held in an
analogous context,33 private parties and entities should not be able to
determine the rights of other private parties in the name of the United
States, which I referred to earlier as decisional authority.
The second step in a refashioned doctrine should focus on whether
the actor should be treated as public or private. The issue is noncontro-
versial if the individual is appointed in conformance with Article II or
receives a federal governmental salary. Such governmental status
ensures public accountability and oversight. A label of "private," how-
ever, by itself is not necessarily damning. Indeed, as the prior examples
attest, it is not always clear whether the entity is public or private,
because attributes of both are present. In such cases, the key in determin-
ing the propriety of the delegation of decisional authority lies in the
applicability of government-wide rules and regulations designed to
ensure that public officials discharge tasks in a public regarding way.
Those rules and regulations, whether FOIA or the Ethics in Government
Act, reflect what we expect from public servants, and so decisions to
exempt actors from such constraints make it more likely that the delega-
tion of decisional authority is impermissible.
30. See, e.g., Thomas A. Coulter, An Overview of the Current Government Contracts Climate,
in THE IMPACT OF RECENT CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: LEADING LAWYERS ON
UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF THE STIMULUS PROGRAM, ADDRESSING COMPLIANCE CONCERNS,
AND ANALYZING THE LATEST REGULATIONS (INSIDE THE MINDS) 73 (2010), available at 2010 WL
1616852.
31. The federal government may own over 90% of AIG's common shares after it converts its
preferred shares. See Erik Holm, UBS Sees Buying Opportunity on AIG Shares as U.S. Exit
Looms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20101018-709152.html.
32. For news perspectives on the AIG Bailout, banks, and GM, and how these incidents have
blurred the private and public lines, see, for example, Carter Dougherty, Stopping a Financial
Crisis, the Swedish Way, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/
business/worldbusiness/23krona.html; King, Jr. & Terlep, supra note 27; Editorial, The Never-
Ending Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/opinion/03tuel.
html.
33. Cf INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (considering the extent to which Congress
can vest executive type functions or significant authority in its own agents).
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In short, private parties' exercise of unchecked decisional govern-
mental authority cannot be squared with the constitutional structure. If a
challenge arises, courts should not invoke the Due Process, nondelega-
tion, or Article II tests. Rather, they should inquire more straightfor-
wardly whether the authority is decisional and whether the entity
exercising such authority is sufficiently removed from governmental
checks to be considered private. From that perspective, at least some of
the developments in the Obama Administration appear constitutionally
problematic.
II. DELEGATIONS TO PRIVATE PARTIES
A. Examples from the Obama Administration
Although it is difficult to assess presidential trends after just two
years, the Obama Administration seems as willing (and perhaps more)
as its predecessors to invite private parties into the government. His
administration has been open to utilization of private entities in a variety
of areas.
1. PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD
In the wake of the Enron debacle, Congress created the PCAOB as
part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200234 to regulate accounting meth-
ods and procedures for publicly traded companies.35 Accounting firms
must register with the Board and comply with the regulatory standards
issued by the Board.3 6 In addition, the PCAOB conducts inspections of
registered accounting firms, both on a regular basis and in response to
allegations of noncompliance with its standards. 7
The PCAOB is unique in that its members are appointed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission to five-year terms38 and subject to
removal by the Commission for good cause shown.39 The President can
remove members of the SEC for cause,4 0 which in turn can remove
members of the PCAOB only for cause, thus insulating members of the
PCAOB more than many other governmental officers from presidential
34. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and
29 U.S.C.).
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-19, invalidated in part by Free Enterp. Fund v. Pub. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151-56 (2010).
36. Id. §§ 7212-13.
37. Id. § 7214.
38. Id. § 7211(e)(5)(a).
39. Id. § 7211(e)(6).
40. Although the statute is ambiguous, the parties stipulated to that restriction on the
President's removal authority. Free Enterp. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148-49; id. at 3182 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
5132011]
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removal. 4 ' In establishing the Board's appointment and removal provi-
sions, Congress precluded any direct role for the President. The Obama
Administration before the Supreme Court nonetheless defended the con-
stitutionality of the Board against arguments that the appointment and
removal provisions violate Article II.42
In defending Congress's scheme, the Administration circumvented
one of the most interesting issues implicated in the case, and one with
potentially the greatest impact-Congress ostensibly created the Over-
sight Board as a private entity outside the federal government, providing
that its members were not to be considered "officers[s] . . . or agent[s]
for the Federal Government,"4 3 and that the Board itself "shall not be an
agency or establishment of the United States Government."" Indeed,
Congress legislated that the salary of the Board members be set in accor-
dance with the private market.45 Moreover, Congress exempted the
Board from FOIA.4 6 Congress by its own terms had attempted to dele-
gate critical policymaking to a private group. The executive branch as
well as petitioner ducked the issue by agreeing that Congress's labeling
was immaterial; instead, all that mattered was that the Board members
exercised "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States" within the meaning of Buckley v. Valeo,4 7 and therefore must be
considered officers of the United States subject to Article II
limitations.48
In Buckley, the Court chose "significant authority" as a threshold
for triggering the Appointments Clause, and explained that the term
encompassed "broad administrative powers: rulemaking, advisory opin-
ions, and eligibility for funds . . . ."4 By the same token, the Court
continued that investigation and information gathering did not rise to the
significant authority level.5 o Hence, by relying on Buckley, the adminis-
tration stressed that the PCAOB is a public entity, and that the only
critical questions to resolve were the propriety of the appointments and
removal provisions. The Supreme Court apparently agreed.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d).
42. Brief for the United States at 29 n.8, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Accounting Co. Oversight
Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 3290435 at *29 n.8.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(b).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 7219(b)-(g).
46. Id. § 7215(b)(5)(A).
47. 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
48. Brief for the United States, supra note 42, at 29 n.8; Brief for Petitioners at 9 n.1, Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Accounting Co. Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861), 2009
WL 2247130 at *9 n.1L
49. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140.
50. Id. at 109-10.
51. Free Enter. Fund v. Public Accounting Co. Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147 (2010).
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2. CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY PANEL
Senators Rockefeller, Snowe, and Nelson introduced a bill that
would create a Cybersecurity Advisory Panel to advise the President on
a variety of cybersecurity issues and thereby protect the flow of e-com-
merce and safeguard increased utilization of the Internet.5 2 Section three
would create a Cybersecurity Advisory Panel, which would include
"representatives of industry, academic, non-profit organizations, interest
groups and advocacy organizations, and State and local governments
." The President was to appoint members of the panel from those
constituencies.5 ' The Panel would convene to assess trends, help formu-
late U.S. policy, suggest implementation for that strategy, and consider
civil liberty impacts. 54 The open meetings provisions of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act would not apply.
In addition to the advisory role, the bill delegates to the Advisory
Panel a more specific function with respect to operation of the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICAAN). 6 Section 8
invests in the Panel a veto over any changes to the current status of the
contract that the Secretary of Commerce would wish to make, including
modifications and renewal. Thus, the Panel would have exerted legal
authority over the future of the ICAAN contract. To date, the Obama
Administration has not addressed the Panel's proposed Section 8
powers.
3. GLOBAL WARMING BILL
The Administration is supporting the Waxman-Markey bill,
which prods the country toward a path to reduce global warming.58 Sec-
tion 705 would require the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
report to Congress at regular intervals the progress made by the United
States to meet its domestic green house gas emission reduction require-
ments as well as international obligations.59 Each section 705 report
must be reviewed by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), which
may issue its own recommendations.6 0 Under the bill, an NAS finding
that additional reductions are required automatically triggers a presiden-
52. Cybersecurity Act of 2009, S. 773, 111th Cong. (2009).
53. Id. § 3(a)(1).
54. Id. § 3(c).
55. Id. § 3(f).
56. Id. § 8(a).
57. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey bill), H.R. 2454,
111th Cong. (2009).
58. See Press Release, supra note 5.
59. Id. § 705(a).
60. Id. § 706(a).
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tial directive to agencies requiring a plan to attain the new target.6 1 No
presidential assessment of the weight of the NAS recommendations is
permitted other than that he is to direct agencies to take remedial steps
as "appropriate."62
4. INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
President Obama, via executive order, 6  enhanced the authority of
the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) that previously had been estab-
lished to counsel the executive branch about possible violations of civil
liberties.' The IOB is a subset of the President's Intelligence Advisory
Board (PIAB), which was created to advise the President on a range of
security issues.65 Members of the PIAB are to be drawn "from among
individuals who are not employed by the Federal Government" 66 and
receive no compensation for their work.6 7 The PIAB is to "assess the
quality, quantity, and adequacy of intelligence collection ....
For its part, the IOB also is to investigate and determine whether
any executive branch individual has broken the law through its intelli-
gence gathering efforts.6 9 President Obama's order directed relevant
executive branch agencies, headed by officials confirmed by the Senate,
to comply with any request for information from the IOB,70 and also
directed the IOB to "forward to the Attorney General information con-
cerning intelligence activities that involve possible violations of Federal
criminal laws or otherwise implicate the authority of the Attorney Gen-
eral . . . ."" The IOB acts akin to an inspector general, although its
61. Id. § 707(b).
62. Id. § 707(a).
63. Exec. Order No. 13,516, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,521, (Nov. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Obama
Executive Order].
64. The IOB initially was established under the Bush II administration. See Exec. Order No.
13462, 3 C.F.R. 184, 185-86 (2008) [hereinafter Bush Executive Order] (establishing the creation
of the IOB and setting out its functions). The Obama Executive Order expanded the authority of
the IOB. Compare Bush Executive Order, 3 C.F.R. 184 at 187 ("To the extent permitted by law,
the [Director of National Intelligence] and the heads of departments concerned shall provide such
information and assistance as the . .. IOB may need to perform functions under this order")
(emphasis added), with Obama Executive Order, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56,521 ("To the extent permitted
by law, the [Director of National Intelligence] and the heads of departments concerned shall
provide such information and assistance as the . .. IOB determine[s] is needed to perform their
functions under this order) (emphasis added).
65. See Bush Executive Order, 3 C.F.R. at 184-85.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 185.
69. See id.
70. See Obama Executive Order, supra note 63, at 56,521.
71. Id.
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members apparently need not comply with many government-wide eth-
ics and conflict of interest restrictions.
5. COMPENSATION CZAR
The Obama Administration, like its predecessor, has appointed so-
termed czars to aid in executive branch initiatives.7 2 The most high pro-
file of these has been Kenneth Feinberg, a New York attorney, who also
served as a "czar" under President Bush in compensating the victims of
9/11.11 More recently, Feinberg has set the compensation that executives
of entities receiving TARP funds can earn.7 4 The rules are binding.
The Obama Administration, however, did not submit Feinberg's name to
the Senate for confirmation, so he cannot be considered a principal
officer. In addition, because Congress had not authorized the Secretary
of the Treasury to appoint anyone to discharge the compensation setting
duties, Feinberg cannot be considered an inferior officer. Interestingly,
although it was widely reported that Feinberg received no salary for his
work,' a recent FOIA request unearthed the fact that Feinberg in fact
received a salary.
Presidents, of course, have long appointed individuals in the private
sector to serve as "czars" or envoys for particular purposes." Presidents
have sent various statesmen abroad as envoys in efforts to avoid political
standoffs," such as Jesse Jackson traveling to Iran to free prisoners or
former President Carter's trip to North Korea.so Such use of envoys
72. See, e.g., TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg.
28,294 (June 15, 2009) [hereinafter TARP Standards] (setting forth the standards applicable to
recipients of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, which purchases "troubles assets from financial
institution[s]," and establishing a special master to oversee the program); September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2009) (creating a compensation fund for victims of
9/11 and granting a Special Master considerable authority over the fund).
73. On November 26, 2001, the Attorney General appointed Kenneth R. Feinberg as Special
Master to the 9/11 Victim's Relief Fund. See Louise Story & Stephen Labaton, Overseer of Big
Pay Is Seasoned Arbitrator, N.Y. TimES, June 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/1 1/
business/l lfeinberg.html.
74. For information regarding the establishment of the office of Special Master, commonly
called "pay czar" under TARP by the Secretary of the Department of Treasury, see TARP
Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. at 28,394.
75. Id. at 28,423.
76. See Story & Labaton, supra note 73.
77. Obama's Executive "Pay Czar" Feinberg Received Six-Figure Salary According to
Documents Uncovered by Judicial Watch, JUDICIAL WATCH (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.
judicialwatch.org/news/2010/sep/obama-s-executive-pay-czar-feinberg-received-six-figure-salary-
according-documents-unc.
78. See discussion of use of envoys in past supra note 9.
79. For a discussion of the use of private entities for diplomatic purposes, see Dickinson,
supra note 9, at 393; Anna Spain, Using International Dispute Resolution To Address the
Compliance Question in International Law, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 807, 839 (2009).
80. Robert Pear, Jackson Is Seeking Talk with Iranian To Free Hostages, N.Y. TiMEs, July
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potentially circumvents senatorial consent and may conflict with Con-
gress's choice of which delegate is to perform particular functions.
6. CONTRACTING OUT
President Obama has continued his predecessors' practice of out-
sourcing a multitude of tasks to the private sector. As with prior admin-
istrations, the current administration has outsourced broadly, including
the authority to collect delinquent taxes and the responsibility to mod-
ernize the Coast Guard's fleet." Moreover, many key aspects of Home-
land Security have been outsourced to private entities,82 including
strategy and implementation of efforts to police the border with Mex-
ico.83 Agencies such as the EPA have relied upon private entities to
prepare proposed rules and respond to congressional inquiries.8 4
As a whole, President Obama's Administration therefore has fol-
lowed its predecessors in using private parties where politically feasible.
In a variety of ways, Obama's Administration has welcomed the exer-
cise of governmental power by private parties.
B. Brief History of Challenges to Private Delegations
Challenges to the private exercise of governmental power under our
federal system have been scant. Most have focused on power exercised
by congressional delegates, although increased criticisms have been lev-
eled at the President for outsourcing decisions.
The canonical case is Carter v. Carter Coal Co." There, the
Supreme Court considered a statutory scheme in which a majority of
miners and producers of two-thirds of the annual tonnage of coal estab-
lished working conditions that would bind the entire group. 86 The maxi
mum hours of work could be set, as well as the minimum wage." The
Court explained that "[t]he effect, in respect to wages and hours, is to
subject the dissentient minority . . . to the will of the stated majority
. ".. . 8 In other words, "[t]he power conferred upon the majority is, in
28, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/28/world/jackson-is-seeking-talk-with-iranian-to-free-
hostages.html; Choe Sang-Hun, Jimmy Carter Tries To Free American in North Korea, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/world/asia/26korea.html.
81. Verkuil, supra note 1, at 58.
82. Id. at 5.
83. Id. at 35-36.
84. Id. at 45-46; see also Steven J. Kelman, Achieving Contracting Goals and Recognizing
Public Law Concerns: A Contracting Management Perspective, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACr
153, 177 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
85. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
86. Id. at 283-84
87. Id.
88. Id. at 311.
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effect, the power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority."" The
Court concluded that "[t]his is legislative delegation in its most obnox-
ious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body,
presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may
be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same busi-
ness." 90 To the Court, the private status of the decisionmakers rendered
the delegation more suspect.
Less well remembered, the Court earlier in A.L.A. Schechter Poul-
try Corp. v. United States questioned Congress's reliance on private par-
ties in establishing codes of fair competition under the National
Industrial Recovery Act.9' Under the Act, trade groups proposed codes
of fair competition for ultimate approval by the President.92 The Court
struck down those sections of the NIRA on both nondelegation and
Commerce Clause grounds.93
In so doing, the Court noted the sweeping power exercised by pri-
vate entities, even though the proposed codes were subject to presiden-
tial authorization.9 4 The Court asked, "would it be seriously contended
that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or indus-
trial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they
deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of
their trade or industries?"95 After acknowledging that Congress under-
standably might wish to delegate to private parties "because such
associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enter-
prises," 96 the Court emphatically stated that "[s]uch a delegation of leg-
islative power is unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with the
constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress."97
Nonetheless, courts subsequently have upheld significant decisional
powers delegated to producer groups under the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 193798 and similar statutes.99 With respect to milk, for
instance, the Secretary of Agriculture issues marketing orders setting
minimum prices that handlers, who process dairy products, must pay to
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 295 U.S. 495, 521-24, 529-30 (1935).
92. Id. at 537.
93. Id. at 551.
94. Id. at 537.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Pub. L. No. 111-202, 50 Stat. 246 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
99. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2101-18 (2006) (cotton); 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2911 (2006) (beef); 7
U.S.C. § 4501-4538 (2006) (dairy).
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dairy farmers for milk products.'" Prior to setting the prices, the Secre-
tary must conduct rulemaking but, before any order can go into effect,
the rule must be approved by the handlers of at least fifty percent of the
milk covered by the proposed order and at least two-thirds of the
affected dairy farmers.'' Dairy farmers and, to some extent, handlers,
can veto any proposed milk marketing order, and the threat of a veto
affords those groups some say in the formulation of the order.'o2 The
Supreme Court has upheld this and similar delegations because the exer-
cise of governmental power by such private groups is subordinate to the
authority of Agricultural Department officials.103 The Supreme Court
has reasoned, therefore, that no untoward delegation of private authority
exists if some type of oversight has been exercised by federal govern-
mental officials.
Congressional delegations to private parties have, on occasion,
been more direct. " In 1893, Congress delegated authority to the Ameri-
can Railway Association to establish a mandatory height for drawbars
on railroad cars, and legislated that failure to comply with the height
requirement subjected the railroad companies to civil penalties."o' The
Supreme Court upheld the delegation with little discussion.10 6 Congress
also has encouraged standard setting by private organizations, subjecting
such standards to minimal oversight.o' More directly, Congress has del-
egated the power to private accreditation organizations to determine hos-
pitals' eligibility for federal funding. 0 Further, private parties have
served on governmental agencies such as the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), which operates as part of the Federal Reserve Sys-
100. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(A) (2006).
101. Id. § 608(c)(8).
102. Id.
103. H.P. Hood & Sons v. United States, 307 U.S. 588, 595 (1939) (milk); United States v.
Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 (1939); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1939)
(tobacco growing areas); United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1127-29 (3d Cir. 1989) (beef
program); United States v. MacMullen, 262 F.2d 499, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1958) (wheat quotas).
104. See, e.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 286 (1908).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 287. According to the Court, a near identical delegation previously had been upheld
in Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904). Taylor, 210 U.S. at 287. Buttfield, however,
did not include delegation to a private party. Buttfield, 192 U.S. at 495-96. See also Auffinordt v.
Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 326-28 (1890) (upholding the government's use of a private appraiser
where an importer disagreed with the government's value determination).
107. Freeman, supra note 1, at 640.
108. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.5 (2010) (deeming institutions accredited as hospitals by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) to meet all of the Medicare
conditions of participation); 42 C.F.R. § 409.3(e) (2010) (requiring foreign hospitals be accredited
by JCAHO to be a qualified hospital under Medicare); 32 C.F.R. § 199.6 (requiring certain
providers seeking payment for services through Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) to be accredited by JCAH and maintain medical records
according to JCAHO standards).
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tem.'" The private members are elected annually by the boards of direc-
tors of the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks, which are privately
owned. 10 The FOMC as a whole discharges the critical policymaking
function of determining sales and purchases of government securities in
the open market."' Its private members draw no compensation from the
United States and are not subject to many government-wide ethics and
conflict of interest restrictions.
In less obvious ways, private parties have played fundamental roles
in shaping federal policy-Congress has authorized presidents to con-
tract out functions to the private sector, whether in running prisons," 2
setting Medicare eligibility," and even in collecting taxes." 4 Presidents
on their own have contracted out similar functions.s Courts rarely have
become involved.116
This abbreviated history suggests that the examples from the
Obama Administration are not unique. Courts have struggled to identify
just what it is about the role of private parties in governance that is
troubling, while recognizing the substantial benefits that can be attained
by incorporating private partners into the government. Congress as well
as presidents have utilized private parties to fashion and implement gov-
ernmental policy.
C. Rationales for Delegation to Private Parties
The examples of private delegations in the Obama Administration
and before exemplify the myriad reasons why utilization of private par-
ties in governance is politically attractive. Sharing power with private
entities can further goals of tapping private sector expertise, discharging
public functions more efficiently, and attaining more legitimacy for the
exercise of public power.
Consider Congress's creation of the PCAOB and delegation of
authority to the National Academy of Sciences. Both reflect efforts to
utilize private expertise in the private sector to help bring relief to press-
109. 12 U.S.C. § 263(a)-(b) (2006).
110. Id. § 263(a).
111. Id. § 263(b) ("The Committee shall consider, adopt, and transmit to the several Federal
Reserve banks regulations, regulations relating to the open-market transactions of such banks").
112. Sharon Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks: The Case of Prisons, in GOVERNMENT BY
CoNTRACT, supra note 84, at 128, 129; Ira Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on
Prison Privatization, 35 UCLA L. REV. 911, 925 (1988).
113. Gillian E. Metzger, Private Delegations, Due Process, and the Duty to Supervise, in
GOVERNMENT BY CoNTRAcT, supra note 84, at 291, 300-03.
114. Verkuil, supra note 1, at 43 n.52.
115. Id. at 42-43.
116. See Robbins, supra note 112, at 919-20 (noting that "the Supreme Court has not
invalidated a private delegation since the New Deal era case of Carter v. Carter Coal Co.").
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ing public problems-in the first instance regulation of publicly traded
firms and, in the second case, that of global warming. Congress author-
ized PCAOB members to draw salaries akin to those in the private sector
specifically to enlist those individuals to help ensure that there be no
repetitions of the Enron debacle. The proposed delegation to eminent
members of the NAS reflects an effort to ensure that such scientific
knowledge be deployed to help the government attain global warming
targets.
At the same time, involving such respected members of the private
sector lends more legitimacy to governmental actions. The government
can point to resulting regulation and defend it on the basis that it had
been reached only through the efforts of private experts, who presuma-
bly were among the most knowledgeable in the field. Similarly, enlisting
heads of private banks to serve on the FOMC ensures that the Commit-
tee can be guided by those with the greatest private sector experience,
and that the private banking community will have greater faith in its
actions.
Congress's delegations to producer groups during the New Deal
embody the same two dynamics. Producer groups presumably know
more than the government about their own needs, so it is more sensible
for the government to rely upon those groups in determining marketing
orders or acreage allotments. Disaffected members of those producer
groups may be more accepting of any marketing order if their peers
helped formulate the order. A democratic process was open for the
members to voice any concerns.
Relying on producer groups arguably is also more efficient. Instead
of having to learn the particular detailed conditions in the dairy or meat
industries, Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture can rely on those
with the most intimate knowledge of those conditions. Similarly, if
industry standards are set by those in the industry, as under the National
Industrial Recovery Act or in the American Railway Association exam-
ple, efficiency can be served.
Historical examples of delegations to private parties highlight the
many reasons that can lead presidents and congresses to enlist their par-
ticipation in governance. Private parties can help the government with
their expertise and, at times, permit greater efficiency in governmental
provision of goods and services. And, such delegations provide political
cover for potentially controversial decisions.
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DELEGATIONS TO PRIVATE ENTITIES
A. The Constitutional Structure
To some, the exercise of public power by private individuals and
groups is not constitutionally problematic. Nothing in the Constitution
specifically prohibits Congress or the President from delegating author-
ity to private individuals. Whether through congressional delegation or
executive branch outsourcing, many governmental type responsibilities
routinely are exercised by private entities and individuals. Medicare
claims are assessed, security measures for the military are pursued, and
tax deficiencies determined. Moreover, as a policy matter, many have
applauded the efficiencies that can arise from shifting services from the
public to private sector.
The silence in the Constitution, however, should not be construed
as authorization for unlimited delegations to private entities. The Fram-
ers' failure to address the exercise of government power by private par-
ties may well have stemmed from their assumption that many such
delegations would be unthinkable. Congress can no more delegate its
power to private groups to determine tax rates than the President can
turn to the same groups to appoint tax commissioners.
Although there has been little analysis about what the Framers may
have anticipated with respect to delegations to private parties, the under-
lying constitutional concern for accountable governance suggests cau-
tion. The division of the Constitution into Articles I, II, and III evidences
an.intent to limit governmental authority to those three headings, all of
which provide a chain of command. Delegations outside the federal gov-
ernment threaten to dilute accountability and obscure that reporting
structure.
Moreover, the entire system of checks and balances, so evident in
the constitutional structure, argues strongly against some congressional
delegation of authority to private parties. The checks of the Appoint-
ments and Impeachment Clauses cannot easily be reconciled with dele-
gations to private parties."' Congressional delegations evade the
President's appointment and Senate's consent powers. In addition, for
both congressional and presidential delegations, the private parties or
groups would not be subject to impeachment. The fact that private par-
ties take no oath pledging fidelity to the Constitution highlights that such
individuals and groups act outside the government. The Constitution
117. As Justice Souter asserted in Weiss v. United States, the Appointments Clause "ensure[s]
accountability and 'precludes[s] the exercise of arbitrary power."' 510 U.S. 163, 186 (1994)
(Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandies, J.,
dissenting)).
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seemingly contemplates that some level of governmental authority be
exercised only by those subject to the accountability mechanisms woven
within. Thus, the system of separated powers implicitly restricts con-
gressional and presidential delegations to private entities. As Justice
Scalia warned decades ago:
I foresee all manner of "expert" bodies, insulated from the political
process, to which Congress will delegate various portions of its law-
making responsibility. How tempting to create an expert Medical
Commission (mostly M.D.'s, with perhaps a few Ph.D.'s in moral
philosophy) to dispose of such thorny, "no win" political issues as the
withholding of life-support systems in federally funded hospitals, or
the use of fetal tissue for research. This is an undemocratic precedent
that was set-not because of the scope of the delegated power, but
because its recipient is not one of the three Branches of
Government."'
To be sure, the Constitution recognizes that Congress can issue Let-
ters of Marque and Reprisal to private parties,119 but that possibility
more closely resembles an authorization for a private cause of action
rather than a delegation of decisional authority. Indeed, that Clause can
be read as an exception to the implied ban on the exercise of govern-
mental power by private parties. There is no affirmative constitutional
authorization for either Congress or the President to share decisional
authority with non-governmental actors.
Without teasing out an elaborate theory, suffice it to say that dele-
gations of decisional authority to private individuals and entities are not
easily reconcilable with the focus on accountability in the constitutional
structure. We expect, or at least hope, that government entities act for
the greater good instead of for private gain. And, there are many checks,
including those of the Appointments and Impeachment Clauses, that
attempt to make that goal a reality. As the Supreme Court recently
warned, "The diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of accounta-
bility . . . . Without a clear and effective chain of command, the public
cannot 'determine on whom the blame or punishment of a pernicious
measure or series of pernicious measures ought really to fall." 12 0 Dele-
gation to private entities masks that chain of command. Indeed, the very
notion of private exercise of governmental power contradicts our suppo-
sition of what is meant by "government": "One can have a government
. . . that benefits from expertise without being ruled by experts."l21
118. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 422 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
120. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155 (2010)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 428 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
121. Id. at 3156.
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Scholars across a wide spectrum of ideologies agree that the Constitu-
tion does not empower governmental officials to offload governmental
powers to private entities that could in turn exercise those powers
outside the constraints faced by public actors.12 2 Indeed, in the criminal
law context, Chief Justice Roberts recently commented that delegations
to private parties should be prohibited because "[a] basic step in organiz-
ing a civilized society is to take that sword out of private hands and turn
it over to an organized government, acting on behalf of all the peo-
ple." 12 3 The constitutional framework does not countenance delegation
of at least some type of governmental authority to private individuals
and groups.
The doctrine should limit presidential as well as congressional dele-
gations to private entities. Courts seldom have examined the limits of
presidential delegation to private parties. Given that Congress cannot
delegate to Kenneth Feinberg directly to determine executive compensa-
tion, may the President or Secretary of Treasury so delegate? If Con-
gress cannot vest in coal organizations the power to fashion workplace
rules as in Carter Coal, can the Secretary of Labor recruit coal organiza-
tions to fulfill that same role?
Congress under the Subdelegation Act1 24 has authorized the Presi-
dent to subdelegate functions that Congress delegates to him. But, does
general congressional authorization for subdelegation permit a greater
role for private parties than if Congress designates the private parties
directly? The potential for congressional aggrandizement is less with
presidential delegation, but the concern for a lack of accountability
remains. Independent contractors are far less accountable to the Presi-
dent and the public than are government officials. The executive branch
does not directly manage contractors' discharge of functions. Contrac-
tors' actions are subject to fewer checks, less in the limelight, and the
reporting structure is more attenuated.
In light of the discussion previously, the Constitution should be
indifferent as to whether the exercise of governmental power by private
parties stems from Congressional or presidential design. 12 5 The Consti-
122. Verkuil, supra note 1, at 106; Thomas Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2167-68 (2004).
123. Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 130 S. Ct. 2184, 2190 (2010) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
124. 3 U.S.C. §§ 301-303 (2006). The Act, however, limits delegations only to "any official
... who is required to be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate . . ." Id.
§ 301.
125. Of course, if Congress forbids the President from delegating authority to private parties,
then the President's authority stands at even a lower ebb. No theory of inherent executive
authority to delegate to private parties has been raised and, in any event, would be difficult to
square with the constitutional design.
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tution prohibits private parties from exercising certain type of govern-
mental power in both contexts. Thus, presidential determinations to
contract out functions should be subject to the same analysis as for con-
gressional delegations. In both contexts, the Constitution reserves for
public officials the power to bind private entities.
Dangers from vesting governmental authority in private producer
groups are not merely theoretical. To use one example, under various
provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937,126
Congress has enlisted producer groups to set the rules that govern the
respective producer communities. Marketing orders bind producers of
mushrooms, beef, milk and other commodities. 127 Large producers of
oranges such as Sunkist successfully pushed for orders limiting the
amount of oranges that could be shipped for consumption within the
country.128 The quota increases growers' revenues at the expense of con-
sumers and, perhaps as importantly, created a new demand for citrus
byproducts for the oranges that could no longer be shipped for market-
ing.12 9 Not coincidentally, Sunkist dominated the market for juice and
other orange byproducts.13 0 Large growers obtained a rule that benefit-
ted themselves at the expense of the smaller growers.' 3'
To provide another example, consider the all too common factual
context of the Supreme Court's decision in Gibson v. Berryhill.132
There, Alabama's legislature had delegated to a Board of independent
optometrists the power to investigate and adjudicate allegations of
wrongdoing leveled against optometrists, including those employed by
retail organizations. 133 To make matters worse, members of the Board
previously had filed charges against the employed optometrists for the
same conduct that they, pursuant to delegated authority, were to
judge. 134 The Supreme Court found that the potential for bias due to the
competition between independent and employed optometrists was too
great.13 1 Private parties when implementing delegated responsibilities do
not lose their "private" incentives.
Thus, delegation to private entities cannot readily be accommo-
dated with the constitutional principle of accountability. And, the consti-
126. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(8) (2006).
127. Id. §§ 608c(2), 612.
128. DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WrrouTr RESPONSIB.TY 5-8 (1993).
129. Id. at 6-7.
130. Id. at 6.
131. Id. at 5.
132. 411 U.S. 564 (1973)
133. Id. at 567.
134. Id. at 567, 569-70, 570 n.7.
135. Id. at 579.
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tutional limitation on delegations to private entities is grounded in
plausible policy considerations.
In considering potential doctrine, many nonetheless may doubt that
the benefits of judicial enforcement outweigh the costs. Other constitu-
tional doctrines, including the nondelegation doctrine,13 6 are under-
enforced. The Supreme Court accordingly has stayed its hand in such
contexts because it is too difficult to formulate a workable doctrine with-
out needlessly trammeling the choices of the democratically elected
Congress or, as in this case, the President as well. Thus, even if the
Constitution may cabin delegations to private individuals, the enforce-
ment costs may be too steep, whether because of the linedrawing
problems, or because of the need to second guess institutional priorities
of Congress. The question, therefore, is whether the Court can fashion a
workable doctrine.
B. The Doctrinal Problem
To date, the Supreme Court has assessed the constitutional propri-
ety of the private exercise of governmental authority through three doc-
trinal lenses. Although analysis under the three doctrinal heads overlap,
all fail to tackle the specific problem arising from the private exercise of
governmental power.
1. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
At times, the Court has considered whether private individuals'
exercise of governmental authority violates the Due Process Clause.
Governmental decisions can only be considered fair or impartial if
undertaken by officials who are not self-interested.
In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., the Supreme Court cited the Due
Process Clause as well as the nondelegation doctrine in invalidating the
Bituminous Coal Act.13 7 According to the Court, Congress's decision to
invest private parties with the power to control peers heightened the
chance of arbitrary conduct.13 s The Court explained that a statute that
attempts to confer the power to regulate upon a competitor "undertakes
136. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) ("[W]e have almost
never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment
that can be left to those executing or applying the law") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
For a discussion of the Tenth Amendment as underenforced, see Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 555-57 (1985) (rejecting application of the Tenth
Amendment as a means of restricting Congress's power under the Commerce Clause). For an
argument that the Due Process Clause also is underenforced, see Harold J. Krent, The Supreme
Court as an Enforcement Agency, 55 WASH. LEE L. REv. 1149, 1161-64 (1998).
137. 298 U.S. 238, 310-11 (1936).
138. Id. at 311.
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an intolerable and unconstitutional interference with personal liberty and
private property . .. .." and continued that the "delegation is so clearly
arbitrary, and so clearly a denial of rights safeguarded by the due pro-
cess clause of the Fifth Amendment, that it is unnecessary to do more
than refer to decisions of this court which foreclose the question."13 9
The Due Process analysis in Carter Coal appears to be an out-
growth of the conflict of interest rationales deployed in other Due Pro-
cess cases questioning the impartiality of government decisionmakers,
as was later expressed in Gibson v. Berryhill.14 0 In such cases, courts
have reasoned that the potential for bias on the part of the government
decisionmaker was too great. Conceivably, under that reasoning, delega-
tions of authority to private entities creating a substantial conflict of
interest might be invalidated.
Subsequent courts, however, have not followed the Carter v. Carter
Coal due process line of reasoning when confronting a challenge to the
private exercise of power. Indeed, many courts have upheld decisions by
producer groups to limit choices by their peers, even when the possibil-
ity of economic advantage exists.'4 1 Nor have courts utilized the Due
Process Clause to assess other problems of majoritarian governance,
whether stemming from the independence of agency decisionmakingl42
or the inappropriateness of legislative redistricting.' 43
In Schweiker v. McClure, the Court considered a Due Process chal-
lenge to private adjudication under the Medicare Part B program.1'
Under the Part B Program, Congress authorized the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to contract with private insurance carriers to review
and pay out deserving claims.14 5 Carrier determinations are subject to a
limited right to review by hearing officers who are also appointed by the
139. Id..
140. 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252,
2264-65 (2009) (holding that impartial judging requires that judges recuse themselves when the
issue to resolve involves an entity from which the judge received substantial campaign
contributions); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (holding that judicial decisionmakers
cannot preside over cases in which they receive any portion of the fines levied).
141. Sunshine Anthracite Coal v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 387-88, 398 (1940) (upholding the
delegation of authority to a private coal commission); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307
U.S. 533, 574, 576-78 (1939) (upholding the delegation of authority to milk producers to
formulate milk-marketing orders); United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1127 (3d Cir. 1989)
(sustaining the delegation of authority to private beef producers under the Beef Promotion and
Research Act).
142. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151-64
(2010); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671-80 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
727-34 (1986).
143. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995);
Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983).
144. 456 U.S. 188, 189 (1982).
145. Id. at 190.
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carrier. 14 6 The lower court invalidated the system of private adjudica-
tion, reasoning that due process required additional procedural safe-
guards.14 7 Accordingly, it ordered de novo hearings before an
administrative judge of the Social Security Administration.' 48
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as long as the Secretary
directs the carriers to appoint only "an attorney or other qualified indi-
vidual with the ability to conduct formal hearings and with a general
understanding of medical matters and terminology," no risk of erroneous
deprivation existed. 149 The fact that the hearing officers were private did
not create any untoward risk of self-dealing, particularly because the
funds used to satisfy the judgments came from the United States Trea-
sury as opposed to the carriers (and hearing officers) themselves.s 0 The
Court did not address whether the delegation to the private party-aside
from the procedural due process issue-was problematic.
Moreover, law implementation by private parties does not necessa-
rily impact the property or liberty interests of private citizens. The inter-
est rate calculations made by the FOMC do not affect property and
liberty interests of citizens directly. Nor would the determinations of the
National Academy of Sciences on global warming necessarily affect
property rights, and the finding with respect to law violations by the
Intelligence Advisory Board would not affect individuals' liberty inter-
ests directly, because any further investigation would rest in the Attor-
ney General's hands. The problem of delegations to private parties does
not simply turn on whether the potential conflict of interest is too great,
as in Gibson v. Berryhill, but rather on the accountability enshrined by
the Constitution.
The Due Process Clause is certainly capacious enough to address
the private exercise of governmental power, but it represents a blunt
instrument. 15 ' Courts have not utilized the Due Process Clause in other
contexts in which the status of the delegate is in question, such as in the
closely related context of independent agencies.' 52 Assessing the private
146. Id. at 191.
147. Id. at 192-93.
148. Id. at 195.
149. Id. at 199 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
150. Id. at 196-200.
151. Gillian Metzger has argued for revitalizing the Due Process Clause as a means to limit
delegation to private parties. Metzger, supra note 1, at 1460-61. Her analysis focuses principally
on the need for procedural regularity. Id. at 1460; see also Metzger, supra note 113, at 299-300.
The same is true for David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J.
647 (1986).
152. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671-80 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
727-34 (1986).
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exercise of governmental authority under the Due Process Clause likely
would result in invalidating only the most sweeping of delegations.
2. NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
During the New Deal in particular, the Court considered whether
Congress's decision to vest governmental authority in private individu-
als and groups violated the nondelegation doctrine, and the Carter v.
Carter Coal majority utilized the nondelegation doctrine as well as the
Due Process Clause to strike down the role of private parties under the
National Industrial Recovery Act. The rule that principles of social pol-
icy should be traced to Congress and not delegates in the executive
branch arguably is of particular salience when considering delegations to
private parties.
Congress, however, doctrinally satisfies its constitutional responsi-
bility to retain its "legislative [p]owers" when it legislates sufficient
guidelines to confine its delegate's discretion in implementing the con-
gressional mandate.153 Requiring articulation of broad guidelines will do
little to protect against private lawmaking. Indeed, in St. Louis, Iron
Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Taylor, as discussed previously, the
Court applied the nondelegation doctrine in assessing a challenge to a
delegation to a private party-the American Railway Association-
exactly in the same manner as it had to a delegation to a governmental
entity. 154 Given the extensive delegations upheld to the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC) to protect the public interest,'55 or to the
Federal Power Commission 156 to set the "just and reasonable rate" to
charge for natural gas,157 such agencies exercise considerable discretion
in fashioning the subsidiary rules that govern so much of the country.
The nondelegation doctrine has not prevented a vast transfer of power
from the legislative to executive branch.
Moreover, the issue raised by the private exercise of governmental
power is not merely articulation of broad social goals. We are worried as
well about whether private parties can fashion policy binding on others,
153. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1.
154. 210 U.S. 281, 287 (1908). Specifically, the Court held that its prior analysis of the
delegation issue in Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904), which involved delegation to
a governmental entity, was controlling in the private delegation context. Taylor, 210 U.S. at 281.
155. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (upholding delegation to
award broadcast licenses according to the "public interest").
156. Congress originally established the Federal Power Commission in 1920, see Federal
Water Power Act, ch. 285, § 1, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), but subsequently replaced it with the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission. See Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 401, 91 Stat. 582 (1977).
157. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 611 (1944) (upholding the
Federal Power Commission's "broad powers of regulation" in fixing "just and reasonable [gas]
rates").
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irrespective of whether a social goal has already been formulated.'
Even if Congress creates the FCC and directs the FCC to take particular
steps, we would presumably not be comfortable if the heads of the FCC
were all private. Congress's articulation of broad social policy does not
ensure accountability for the subsequent implementation of those princi-
ples. The nondelegation doctrine as currently interpreted, therefore,
would not confine the exercise of power by private entities
sufficiently. 159
3. ARTICLE 11 CONCERNS
Finally, private delegations might also be reviewed under the Presi-
dent's Article II appointment and removal powers. Delegations to pri-
vate parties arguably threaten the Constitution in part by circumventing
the executive branch control that was designed to protect all individuals
from governmental overreaching. From this perspective, the problem is
not principally one of standards articulation, as with the nondelegation
doctrine,1o but rather one of preserving the political accountability that
arises from the Founders' decision to vest centralized control over law
enforcement in one chief executive through the appointment and
removal authorities. In the absence of such control, governmental
authority might be exercised for private, self-interested ends. Article II
addresses the concerns of private delegations more than the prior two
formulations.
Under the Appointments Clause, presidents enjoy the power to
appoint all superior officers of the United States. 16 ' Through the
appointment power, presidents can ensure that only officers they
approve of are enforcing the law. Article II provides that the President
must appoint all superior officers, and that Congress can decide whether
to vest appointment authority over inferior officers in the President,
158. Paul Verkuil situated his concern about untoward involvement of private parties in
governance in the non-delegation doctrine. See Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to
Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 84, 310, 310.
159. The Office of Legal Counsel, however, has analyzed delegations to private parties
principally under the nondelegation doctrine. See Memorandum on Constitutional Limitations on
Federal Government Participation in Binding Arbitration from Walter Dellinger, Assistant
Attorney General, to John Schmidt, Associate Attorney General (Sept. 7, 1995), available at http:/
/www.justice.gov/olc/arbitn.fin.htm.
160. Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218-219 (1989) ("[S]o long as Congress
provides an administrative agency with standards guiding its actions such that a court could
"'ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed,"' no delegation of legislative authority
trenching on the principle of separation of powers has occurred") (quoting Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989)); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)
(explaining that it is "constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy,
the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority").
161. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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heads of departments, or courts of law.16 2 There have been disagree-
ments over line-drawing, particularly between superior and inferior
officers, 16 3 but consensus exists over the role that the Appointments
Clause plays under the Constitution.'" The President's choice of officer
influences the exercise of delegated authority. To some extent, presi-
dents therefore stand accountable for the exercise of all authority dele-
gated by Congress. 16 5
In addition, all officers of the United States must take an oath of
office to uphold the Constitution. That oath signifies a more profound
obligation to the public trust than a mere contractual duty. For serious
malfeasance in office, officers can be impeached. Delegations to private
parties, as with contractual relations, can be rescinded, but only public
officials face the very public removal from office via impeachment.
Conformance with Article II defines in part what it means to be a public
official.
Congressional delegations of authority to private parties-whether
to a union, producer group, or single individual-bypass the presidential
appointment authority. If Congress vested authority in the National
Academy of Sciences, the resulting execution of the law could not be as
readily traced to the President, and his appointment authority would be
circumvented. Congress as a whole also would thereby preclude a role
for senatorial consent.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has insisted that Congress play no
direct role in the appointment of officers. In Buckley the Court consid-
ered a congressional measure empowering the Speaker of the House and
the president pro tempore of the Senate to appoint four members of the
newly created electoral commission under the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971.166 The Court held that Congress could not participate
in the appointment process, either directly or indirectly, 6 7 and noted that
the "debates of the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers,
are replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the
National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 658-666 (1997); Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 670-73 (1988).
164. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 660 ("[T]he Appointments Clause ... is more than a matter of
'etiquette or protocol'; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional
scheme. By vesting the President with the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior)
officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon
the Executive and Judicial Branches") (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1975)).
165. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 118-41; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117, 163-64 (1926).
166. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6.
167. Id. at 130.
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two branches."'18 Respecting the President's appointment authority was
critical to ensuring that Congress take no part in execution of the law
through appointment of officers. If Congress retained close supervision
of the private delegate, then Congress would in essence oversee execu-
tion of its own laws, a role that the Supreme Court has held would con-
flict with the Constitution. 6 9
Similarly, in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citi-
zens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, the Court considered whether
Congress, in establishing a compact to oversee administration of D.C.
area airports, could subject major decisions of that compact to a board of
review, consisting of nine members of Congress in their individual
capacities as users of the airports. 170 The Court held that the board of
review, through its veto power, exercised significant authority under the
laws of the United States and hence invalidated the continuing role of
members of Congress on the Board."' In the eyes of the Court, the
Board was "a blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power
... "172 Congressional delegation of power to private individuals cannot
easily be reconciled with Article II.
The Supreme Court also has recognized under Article II the Presi-
dent's inherent right to remove any officer subject to his appointment
power. Although there has been much litigation over whether that
removal authority should be plenary,'73 the Court repeatedly has held
that the removal power follows the appointment authority.174 In Myers,
the Supreme Court stated that "Article II grants to the President the
executive power of the government-i.e., the general administrative
control of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment
and removal of executive officers-a conclusion confirmed by his obli-
gation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed . . . ."17 The
168. Id. at 129.
169. Cf Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S 714, 733-34 ("[O]nce Congress makes its choice in
enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its
enactment only . . . by passing new legislation"); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132 ("The position that
because Congress has been given explicit and plenary authority to regulate a field of activity, it
must therefore have the power to appoint those who are to administer the regulatory statute is both
novel and contrary to the language of the Appointments Clause").
170. 501 U.S. 252, 255 (1991).
171. Id. at 277.
172. Id.
173. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 673 (1988) (questioning the adequacy of the President's
authority over an independent counsel); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 717-21 (1986)
(questioning the adequacy of the President's removal authority over the Comptroller General).
174. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 686; Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714, 722-23; Weiner v. U.S., 357 U.S.
349, 353 (1958); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626-27 (1935); Myers v. U.S.,
272 U.S. 52, 118 (1926) ("[T]he association of removal with appointment of executive officers is
not incompatible with our republican form of government").
175. 272 U.S. at 163-64.
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President must be able to remove a superior officer "on the ground that
the discretion regularly entrusted to that officer by statute has not been
on the whole intelligently or wisely exercised." 7 6 Presidents cannot
superintend administration of the laws effectively if they cannot, as a
last resort, threaten to discharge officials, at least if they are neglectful of
their duties. Again, in Morrison v. Olson, the Court stressed the impor-
tance of the removal provision in permitting the President "sufficient
control over the independent counsel to ensure that the President is able
to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.""'Although the Court
concluded in the independent counsel case that the removal authority
need not be plenary,17 1 some form of removal authority was constitu-
tionally required and, together with other control mechanisms, must
ensure that the President retain sufficient control to exercise his constitu-
tionally assigned duties. 17 9
The removal authority reflects the President's here and now power
to affect policy-if he is aghast at what the Attorney General has done,
he can remove him or her. And, President Nixon so proceeded in the
famed Saturday night massacre by removing from office both Attorney
General Elliot Richardson and interim Attorney General William Ruck-
elshaus in the same night for their refusal to fire Archibald Cox, the
special Watergate counsel, from office.Iso This is not to suggest that we
should applaud President Nixon's conduct, but rather recognize the prac-
tical importance of the removal authority. In the interests of keeping
their jobs, officeholders will hew to the policies and procedures favored
by the President. Indeed, in the recent Free Enterprise Fund case, the
Court focused almost exclusively on the removal authority in holding
invalid PCAOB's structure.1 8' The fact that neither the President nor the
SEC could remove members of the PCAOB at will, while members of
the SEC were themselves protected from at will dismissal, was determi-
native.182 To the Court, exercise of close removal authority was critical
to ensuring presidential supervision under Article 11.' Otherwise, the
President's "ability to execute the laws-by holding his subordinates
accountable for their conduct-is impaired."' 84
176. Id. at 135.
177. 487 U.S. at 696.
178. Id. at 692-93.
179. Id.
180. See Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-
So-Unitary Executive, 51 DuKE L.J. 963, 1004 (2001).
181. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Accounting Co. Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151-62.
182. Id. at 3153 ("The result is a Board that is not accountable to the President, and a President
who is not responsible for the Board").
183. Id. at 3154.
184. Id.
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Congressional delegations to private parties may deprive presidents
of the removal power. If Congress lodges the power to set standards in a
private group, for example, the President cannot remove members of
that group from office. 1 5 Under the global warming bill,"' the Presi-
dent could not remove members of the National Academy of Science
even if he believed they engaged in misconduct."' Similarly, if Con-
gress designates a particular individual to safeguard security at airports,
the President would not be able to remove the individual even if he
determined that the individual's conduct jeopardized national security.
More problematically, a congressional threat to withdraw delega-
tion to a particular person or entity may be tantamount to congressional
exercise of a removal authority. The officeholder would look only to
Congress for direction. The Supreme Court categorically has determined
that Congress itself can play no role in the removal of individuals exer-
cising significant authority under the laws of the United States.
The Supreme Court's decision in Bowsher v. Synar is illustra-
tive. 8" In invalidating the Comptroller General's role under the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act, the Court focused on the critical importance of
the removal authority.' Although the President appoints the Comptrol-
ler General to a fifteen-year term of office, Congress made the Comp-
troller General removable at the initiative of Congress for any one of
several causes.190 The Court held that "Congress cannot reserve for itself
the power of removal of an officer charged with execution of the laws
except by impeachment."' 91 The Court explained that "once Congress
makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends."' 92 Other-
wise, Congress would be able both to exercise a de facto appointment
authority and a removal authority, permitting it to influence the exercise
of delegated authority."9 Indeed, in Myers the Court invalidated Con-
gress's participation in removal of the postmaster.194
Viewed with an Article II lens, congressional determinations to
delegate decisional authority outside the President's control are suspect.
185. Contrast to Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 409 (1989), in which the President
could exercise a removal authority over the Article I judges on the Commission, but just to the
extent of their participation in that role.
186. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey bill), H.R. 2454,
111th Cong. (2009).
187. Id. § 186(c)(3).
188. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
189. Id. at 721-27.
190. Id. at 728-29.
191. Id. at 726.
192. Id. at 733.
193. Id. at 734.
194. 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926).
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The President's Article II powers of appointment and removal are
designed not merely to augment executive power, but to protect individ-
ual liberty."' To ensure that public power is exercised in a responsible
way, the President should stand formally accountable for the exercise of
authority delegated by Congress. Congressional delegations to trade
groups and others can rob the President of his power to coordinate law
implementation efforts and, at the same time, permit Congress too much
influence in the execution of law.
Nonetheless, the Article II perspective is underinclusive for at least
two reasons. First, Congress may delegate governmental authority in a
way that does not trigger the President's appointment and removal
authorities. Only the appointment of an individual to an "office" triggers
the appointment power. The Supreme Court stated in United States v.
Hartwell that the "term embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolu-
ment and duties," 9 6 and later contrasted the full-time clerk position in
Hartwell with a civil surgeon's duties in United States v. Germaine,"
which were "occasional and intermittent." 98 The Court followed that
definition in Auffmordt v. Hedden,99 concluding that a private appraiser
evaluating the worth of imported goods at the behest of the government
did not hold an office-the appraiser worked for the government only
infrequently on an as-needed basis.20 The Court later in Buckley reiter-
ated that "office" required the exercise of governmental authority over a
period of time.2 0 ' Under the "occasional and intermittent" standard, pri-
vate parties could wield substantial authority without triggering Article
H. Congressional delegation to a private group of the power to set stan-
dards, for instance, likely would be considered "occasional" and not
transform the private group into federal officers.2 02
Nor would revising the Buckley formulation be cost free. Congress
long has delegated enforcement authority to state governmental officials
that evade any strictures of the Appointments Clause. For instance, Con-
gress has approved state compacts 203 and authorized state officers to
195. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) ("The declared purpose of
separating and dividing the powers of government, of course, was to 'diffus[e] power the better to
secure liberty'") (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952))
(Jackson, J., concurring).
196. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1867).
197. 99 U.S. 508 (1878).
198. Id. at 512.
199. 137 U.S. 310 (1890).
200. Id. at 326-28.
201. 424 U.S. 1, 125-26 (1975). As the Office of Legal Counsel has asserted, "An officer's
duties are permanent, continuing, and based upon responsibilities created through a chain of
command rather than by contract. The Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 159.
202. See Fairfax, supra note 10, at 448.
203. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 443 (1981) (analyzing a congressionally
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enforce federal laws through the power of arrest and criminal prosecu-
tion.20 The recent flap over the Arizona immigration statute highlights
the role that state officials can play (or not play) in implementing the
federal immigration scheme.20 5 States share responsibility with the fed-
eral government for implementing Medicaid, Medicare, and other social
welfare programs. 206 No one could claim that such state officers, in light
of their duties, should be considered to occupy federal offices, even
though they may all be exercising "significant authority pursuant to the
laws of the United States."207
Moreover, the Appointments Clause lens might be underinclusive
for a separate reason. Arguably, the President's appointment authority
would not be violated if executive branch officials in turn delegate their
authority to private individuals and groups. The President appointed the
officials in conformance with the Appointments Clause and the officials
remain subject to removal for their decisions to delegate, among other
actions. Yet, individuals affected by contractors' actions cannot directly
hold the government accountable for such conduct, whether through tort
or APA review. Contractors are considered "independent" principally
because they are not subject to direct supervision of government offi-
cials. The Buckley test, therefore, would not prevent executive branch
officials from delegating decisional authority to private individuals,
much as happened with Kenneth Feinberg.
Some of the examples from the Obama Administration, therefore,
may not involve offices. The proposed delegation of authority to the
National Academy of Sciences, for instance, is so discrete that no office
thereby is created. Similarly, the obligation of the Cybersecurity Panel to
review the ICAAN contract would not transform that advisory body into
an office. Historically, the delegations to producer groups do not cir-
sanctioned interstate compact regarding procedures for the transfer of a prisoner in one
jurisdiction to the temporary custody of another jurisdiction); Beebe v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 129 F.3d 1283, 1285-86 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (examining a congressionally approved
interstate compact including Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia regarding the
creation of a public transportation system).
204. Congress, through the Judiciary Act of 1789, authorized state justices of the peace to
arrest those suspected of violating federal criminal provisions. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33,
1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789). See also United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1167-68 (5th Cir. 1977)
(noting that Congress has authorized state law enforcement officers to conduct arrests for federal
crimes).
205. For a discussion of the Arizona immigration law and the challenges to its
constitutionality, see United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985-992 (D. Ariz. 2010).
206. Freeman, supra note 1, at 592-94 (discussing the concept of shared governmental
authority between states and federal agencies).
207. The Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 159. Indeed, the Office of Legal Counsel has
summarized that the "Appointments Clause simply is not implicated when significant authority is
devolved upon non-federal actors." Id.
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cumvent the President's appointment power because the groups' duties
are not pervasive. The Obama Administration's selection of Feinberg as
compensation czar may not have created an office. Indeed, other con-
tracting out decisions might bypass Article II constraints as well.
Thus, strict application of the Article II appointment and removal
powers would limit congressional delegations to private parties but not
remove all concerns for the private discharge of governmental authority.
The Article II perspective would permit private parties in some contexts
to exercise binding authority over other private parties. As currently
constituted, therefore, Article II does not fully capture the array of dele-
gations that are problematic.208
No doctrine specifically addresses the precise problem raised by
private parties' exercise of governmental powers. 209 The Due Process,
nondelegation and Article II lenses have distorted the problems posed by
private parties' participation in governance. Moreover, those doctrines
even if applied consistently by courts would not cover many problematic
instances of delegations to private parties.
C. Toward a New Doctrine
If a new doctrine is to be formulated, the first determinant is the
quantum of authority exercised by private parties that is constitutionally
problematic. Not all involvement by private parties should be constitu-
tionally prohibited-private groups and individuals can provide advice
or build roads without transgressing the constitutional scheme. The sec-
ond question, which perhaps is the thorniest, is the extent to which gov-
ernment constraints sufficiently check the individual or entity receiving
the delegation. In essence, determining whether the actor is "public" or
"private" should not be dispositive given the wide panoply of hybrid
governmental structures that exist today. Rather, in any case in which
doubt exists as to the "public" status of the entities, the key should be
whether the actors in question are subject to enough governmental
checks to guard against arbitrary or self-serving conduct. If workable
208. Revising Article II to encompass such delegations would be inefficient. Requiring
formalized appointment procedures for state and private parties who have limited, though
important, roles under federal law would be cumbersome, to say the least.
209. Courts at times, while not preventing delegations, have held that constitutional restrictions
attach despite the delegation. In West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988), the Court held that the
Eighth Amendment bound a private physician attending a prisoner. The Court, however, has
restricted the holding to functions "that are 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State."'
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 352 (1974)). Given the interchangeability of so many functions between the government and
the private market, few functions performed by private parties will be subjected to constitutional
constraints.
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tests can be fashioned to generate answers for these two questions, then
an enforceable doctrine is plausible.
1. REQUISITE QUANTUM OF AUTHORITY
Private individuals and entities wield tremendous influence on the
administration, whether through lobbying or advice. To the extent that
the Constitution limits the ability of private parties to participate in gov-
ernance, judicial doctrine must ascertain what type of power and influ-
ence is permissible. Advice obviously is compatible with the
accountability demanded in the Constitution, but when are actions by
private parties inconsistent with that accountability principle?
a. Scope
One possibility is to examine the extent of duties. What if individu-
als and groups only work on a very part-time basis for the government,
irrespective of whether they are affecting the rights and duties of outsid-
ers? Members of the National Academy of Sciences and Kenneth Fein-
berg presumably hold full-time jobs in addition to their work for the
federal government. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Buckley intimated
that one marker of an "office" under the laws of the United States lay in
the extent of duties performed.
Focusing on the extent of duties, however, ignores that private indi-
viduals can have a profound effect on others even if only acting in a
discrete sphere, as the National Academy of Sciences and Cybersecurity
Panel examples suggest. As discussed in analyzing the drawbacks to an
Article II approach to delimiting delegations to private parties, what
should count is whether outsiders are bound by the determinations of the
private delegate. Our concern is whether the private party binds others
through that delegation, backed by the coercive force of the government,
even if that governmental function is not extensive enough to be charac-
terized as an office.
b. Importance of Area
Another possibility is to vary the test depending upon how key the
area is in which the private individual or group works. Perhaps no
authority should be delegated in areas that are considered "core" or
"inherent."
Indeed, in elaborating the state action doctrine, the Supreme Court
has held that some constitutional guarantees attach to core governmental
functions, even when they are contracted out. In rare contexts as with the
provision of health care in prisons, the Supreme Court has held that con-
stitutional guarantees must attach, no matter whether the actor is consid-
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ered public or private.2 10 Under the state action doctrine, there is a small
set of actions that must be subject to constitutional constraints.
The core government functions analysis as used in state action
cases does not limit the power of the President or Congress to utilize
private parties to enforce federal law or implement federal programs.
Rather it holds that, when Congress or the President chooses to use pri-
vate parties, then such private parties must be bound by certain core
constitutional restraints. The core government functions test has not
been used to prevent delegation ad ab initio.
Focusing on the importance or historical character of the function
provided, moreover, seems hopeless. Consider the trend in the local gov-
ernmental sphere to contract out or privatize toll roads, parking meters,
and water supplies-functions most had thought to be governmental.2 11
On the federal level, prisons have been privatized,2 12 and contractors
such as Blackwater have been hired to aid in international security.2 13
Much of our wars overseas have depended on private contractors.
We have not reached any consensus on what functions are so
"core" that they cannot be contracted out by the executive branch or
delegated by Congress. Education once was supplied by private parties,
then became the province of the government, and now has become in
214part privatized once again. Reliance on private parties in military con-
texts has ebbed and flowed throughout our history.2 15 Judicial decision-
making may appear to be a core function, and yet the Supreme Court has
held that quasi-judicial decisionmaking is appropriate for delegation to
private parties.2 16 Public and private officials largely exercise functions
that are indistinguishable.
210. West, 487 U.S. at 56-57. For a later decision narrowing the scope of West, see American
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 57-58 (1999) (holding that private
insurers implementing a state workmen's compensation scheme were not state actors); United
States v. Day, 591 F.3d 679, 685-89 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that a private security force hired by
a State need not conform to Fourth Amendment constraints).
211. See Glanzer, supra note 9, at 443 n.3; Robert A. Poole, Jr., Privatization: A New
Transportation Paradigm, 553 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 94, 96-97 (1997).
212. Lucas Anderson, Comment, Kicking the National Habit: The Legal and Policy Arguments
for Abolishing Private Prison Contracts, 39 Pus. CON. L. J. 113, 115-120 (2009).
213. For a discussion of Blackwater and its role in National Security, see Andes Healy, The
Constitutionality of Amended 10 U.S.C. § 802(A)(10): Does the Military Need a Formal
Invitation to Reign in "Cowboy" Civilian Contractors, 62 FLA. L. REv. 519 (2010). See also Am.
Mfrs., 526 U.S. at 44-49 (addressing the cycling of insurance functions under workmen's
compensation statutes).
214. For a discussion of the cycling of education of private to public and back to private, see
Martha F. Davis, Learning To Work: A Functional Approach to Welfare and Higher Education,
147 Bure. L. REv. 147 (2010); Kamina A. Pinder, Federal Demand and Local Choice:
Safeguarding the Notion of Federalism in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2010).
215. See supra notes 202, 204.
216. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
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c. Nature of Duties Discharged
The key should be the type of authority delegated, not the area or
extent. Congress in the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998
(FAIR Act),217 for example, defined an inherently government function
not with reference to areas long thought central to the executive branch
such as law enforcement but rather by activities that require "either the
exercise of discretion in applying Federal Governmental authority or the
making of value judgments in making decisions for the Federal Govern-
ment . . . ."2 1 8 Similarly, OMB in Circular A-76 has directed that some
governmental actions can never be contracted out.219 For instance, the
executive branch cannot delegate power that "[blind[s] the United States
to take or not to take some action by contract, policy, regulation, author-
ization, order, or otherwise" or "[s]ignificantly affect[s] the life, liberty,
or property of private persons."220
Those rules persuasively focus on the nature of the power granted
to the private individual or group. Courts should focus on the power of
private individuals and entities to bind others. Of course, private individ-
uals via federal contracts affect others in a wide variety of contexts,
whether as security personnel in Iraq or through construction projects
domestically. Viewed at its simplest, the question is not whether the
entity makes an impact on another through discharge of functions under
a federal contract, but whether its action binds others through poli-
cymaking delegated by the government. The situation to avoid is not
delegated power per se, as with a mercenary army or private engineer,
but rather empowering private entities with the power to bind others
through the exercise of policy discretion.22'
The suggested approach to define the limits of delegation to private
parties follows a line of Supreme Court cases assessing the analogous
question of when Congress can delegate to one of its constituent parts.
In both contexts, the issue is whether entities other than Congress can,
217. 31 U.S.C. § 501 (2006).
218. Id. § 5(2)(B).
219. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGEr, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR. No. A-
76 A-2 (2003).
220. Id. In addition, agencies under FAIR also must classify whether employees exercise
inherently governmental functions or not, and Congress at times has stepped in to "reorder"
agency priorities, usually at the behest of public employee unions. Stan Soloway & Alan
Chvotkin, Federal Contracting in Context: What Drives It, How to Improve It, in GOVERNMENT
BY CONTRACT, supra note 84, at 192, 221.
221. The discretionary function exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act provides a close
analogy. Congress determined to preserve the exercise of policymaking from secondguessing in
court, but opened judicial review to governmental actions with substantial impacts that were
situation specific. See generally Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing
Deterrence: Federal Governmental Liability in Tort, 38 UCLA L. REV. 871 (1991).
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consistent with the constitutional framework, bind others through the
exercise of policymaking authority.22 2 As discussed previously, deci-
sional authority refers to the power of individuals to bind others through
setting standards, formulating policy, enforcing the law, and approving
or vetoing executive branch proposals.
In INS v. Chadha,2 23 the Court held that Congress cannot reserve
for one house or a committee the power to bind those outside the branch:
Congress may not take "action that ha[s] the purpose and effect of alter-
ing the legal rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside the Legis-
lative Branch."2 24 Similarly, in Metropolitan Washington Airports
Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise,22 5 the Court
echoed the Chadha analysis in evaluating the role of congressional
members of a Board of Review established to review major decisions
with respect to operation of DC area airports. Given that a veto by the
Board was binding and reflected a type of policy decision, the Court
concluded that the innovative Board of Review structure violated the
Constitution.226 Committees of Congress could affect the rights of pri-
vate parties through advice and influence, but the Court drew the line at
any action that more formally has a legal affect on the parties.
The Chadha focus on "altering the legal rights, duties and rela-
tions" of others has salience in the private delegate context. Private indi-
viduals and entities can provide advice, work as initial factfinders, and
implement details of federal governmental programs under governmen-
tal supervision, but the Constitution does not countenance delegation of
the power to make binding decisions.
Unquestionably, a focus on "altering the legal rights, duties and
relations" of others eschews any weighing of the functional importance
of the private party's role. The suggested approach refers not to any
pragmatic evaluation of how influential an individual or group may be,
but rather on the formal authority to bind others.
The Supreme Court previously has pursued a similar approach in
attempting to determine whether the private delegate possessed the
authority to bind others. For instance, in the marketing order cases, if
private producer groups cannot impose changes on member producers
without the official imprimatur of a government official, then no private
222. Metzger labels such authority as quintessentially "governmental." Metzger, supra note 1.
The terminology is different, yet the focus on the need to keep decisional authority in
governmental hands is similar.
223. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
224. Id. at 952.
225. 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
226. Id. at 274-77.
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delegation infirmity exists.2 27 In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins,22 8 the Supreme Court held that the advisory role private produc-
ers played in recommending coal prices did not constitute an unlawful
delegation of executive power to private individuals because the private
members "function[ed] subordinately to the [public] Commission. It, not
the [private producers], determines the prices."229 Other courts have
adopted the same approach when assessing the legitimacy of a delega-
tion to a private party from an entity within the executive branch.230
Although the Supreme Court in the Schechter case adopted a more
functionalist line and stated that the massive power in fact exercised by
private trade groups under the NIRA doomed the delegation, more
recent courts have hewed the formalist line.23 1 As Justice Cardozo stated
in concurrence in the earlier case, "it is the imprimatur of the President
that begets the quality of law" and not the plans forwarded for approval
by the trade groups.232 In other words, private groups do not exercise
decisional authority if the executive branch holds the formal power to
approve whatever is forwarded by the private entity. 23 3 Even though the
private groups in effect make law, the required governmental approval
makes the delegation acceptable.
Similarly, if Congress provided that private groups prospectively
could set standards binding on the industry, a serious private delegation
issue would arise, but not if the private group merely suggested the stan-
dards to the Department of Agriculture. Discipline meted through the
self-regulatory authority of the New York Stock Exchange must be sub-
227. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 307 U.S. 588 (1939); United States v. Rock
Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 (1939); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 6 (1939) (designation
of tobacco growing areas); United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989) (beef program);
United States v. MacMullen, 262 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1958) (wheat quotas).
228. 310 U.S. 381 (1940); see also Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 86-87 (3d Cir. 1984);
Chiglades Farm, Ltd. v. Butz, 485 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1973); cf. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko,
534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001).
229. Sunshine Anthracite Coal, 310 U.S. at 399.
230. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) (upholding statutorily
mandated private arbitration of compensation claims); Todd & Co., Inc. v. SEC, 557 F.2d 1008
(3d Cir. 1977); R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1952); see also Metzger, supra
note 1 (arguing for the need for closer oversight when the impact of private actions on private
parties is greater).
231. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
232. Id. at 552 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
233. Mandatory arbitration before private arbitrators poses a ticklish example. For generations,
the federal government opposed arbitration, but began to relent in the late twentieth century as the
movement toward alternative dispute resolution gained steam. Tapping private parties to resolve
claims involving the United States cuts close to the principles discussed in the paper. In Union
Carbide, the Court noted that the arbitrators were "civilian," 473 U.S. at 590, but did not articulate
or raise any particular concern. Nor was any concern raised by the parties on that issue.
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ject to SEC review.2 34 This is not to suggest that reliance on private
entities as initial government policymakers reflects wise policy. Govern-
ment officials' utilization of the private sector may resemble abdication
more than a constructive partnership. Yet, courts likely will not scruti-
nize executive branch practice to ascertain when supervision is too lax.
Indeed, even if so inclined, courts likely could not distinguish occasions
when private parties wield excessive de facto authority from those in
which the advice is appropriate. The formal line of decisional authority
is easier to police.
Some corroboration for the focus on decisional authority can be
gleaned from the approach pursued by the Office of Legal Counsel in
considering the "constitutional limitations on employing private contrac-
tors or individuals to perform certain tasks now performed by Depart-
ment of Justice employees." 235 The first set of tasks included program
analyst and manager positions responsible for grant activities. The func-
tions included "the development, monitoring and promotion of criminal
justice (including drug prevention) . . . and related programs adminis-
tered by State and local government agencies" as well as "provision of
technical assistance to State/local agencies in the form of short-term
training on technical matters" and the "dissemination of information
"236
To resolve the issue, OLC first explained that the Appointments
Clause in large part guided the decision as to the type of duties that
could only be exercised by officers of the United States-those that
involved the exercise of "significant authority" within the meaning of
Buckley. 237 The OLC continued that:
information gathering, investigative, and advisory functions that do
not involve final actions affecting third party rights may be per-
formed by private parties or "independent" contractors. Similarly,
purely ministerial and internal functions, such as building security,
mail operations, and physical plant maintenance, which neither affect
the legal rights of third parties outside the Government nor involve
the exercise of significant policymaking authority may be performed
by [private] persons . . . .238
In applying those distinctions, OLC reiterated that "private individ-
uals may not determine the policy of the United States, or interpret and
apply federal law in any way that binds the United States or affects the
234. See, e.g., Todd & Co., 557 F.2d at 1012.
235. Constitutional Limits on "Contracting Out" Department of Justice Functions Under OMB
Circular A-76, 14 Op. O.L.C. 94, 94 (1990).
236. Id. at 94-95.
237. Id. at 96-97.
238. Id. at 99.
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legal rights of third parties. Nor can any private individuals make fund-
ing decisions."239 The program analysts and monitors "simply study and
make recommendations concerning the compliance of various state and
local programs," and while they assisted in policy formation, they did
not "determine the final policy of the Department of Justice. Nor can
these employees take any independent action on behalf of the United
States affecting the rights of grantees."2"
OLC then analyzed the duties performed by another group of DOJ
officials, those who occupied historical research support positions in the
Office of Special Investigations. Although "the investigation of criminal
activity is an inherently governmental function . . . the historical
research support personnel at issue here conduct background research
and translation under the direction of . . . properly appointed federal
officers."24 1 OLC concluded that the private individuals acted more like
consultants than FBI officials or prosecutors.242
In the private contractor setting as well, the executive branch can-
not delegate decisional authority to private parties. Private prison offi-
cials, for instance, cannot make binding decisions on disciplinary
matters that result in lengthening confinement. Consider the Eleventh
Circuit's recent decision in Hilario-Paulino v. Pugh.2 43 A federal pris-
oner challenged imposition of discipline in a privately operated prison
that resulted in extending his stay behind bars.2 4 The Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) had contracted with a private group to administer discipline, and
it directed the private group to follow BOP policy in making such deci-
sions.24 5 Of critical importance, the BOP permitted every adversely
affected prisoner to appeal the discipline to government deci-
sionmakers. 246 As the court stated, "the fact that the BOP provides a
final layer of de novo review allays any concerns regarding the delega-
tion of the initial stages of disciplinary proceedings . . . ."24 Contracting
out decisions in the prison context otherwise could readily fall afoul of
the reconstituted doctrine.
Moreover, Congress, through the Debt Collection Act Amendments
of 1986,248 authorized the Attorney General to retain private counsel to
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 100.
242. Id.
243. 194 F. App'x 900 (11th Cir. 2006).
244. Id. at 901.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 31 U.S.C. § 3718(b)(1)(A) (2006).
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assist in the collection of non-tax debts owed to the United States. In
signing the legislation, President Reagan had counseled:
I am approving [the amendments] knowing that the Attorney General
will take all steps necessary to ensure that any contract entered into
with private counsel contains provisions requiring ongoing supervi-
sion of the private counsel so that all fundamental decisions, includ-
ing whether to initiate litigation and whether to settle or compromise
a claim, are executed by an officer of the United States, as required
by the Constitution.249
The OLC analysis and presidential signing statement conform
closely to the test advocated in this article. The Constitution indeed lim-
its both presidential and congressional delegations to private individuals
and entities. Private parties under our Constitution cannot be empowered
in the name of the United States to bind other private parties. Delega-
tions proposed under President Obama's watch, as under those of his
predecessors, have transgressed that constitutional principle by vesting
in private parties decisional authority to bind others.
2. SUFFICIENCY OF GOVERNMENTAL CHECKS
In the vast majority of cases, determining whether the private group
exercises decisional authority is determinative. But, an increasing num-
ber of cases exist in which it is not possible to conclude whether the
group in fact is public or private. The constitutionality of such delega-
tions, therefore, would hinge on the label affixed to the group. Individu-
als who are appointed by the President, take an oath of office, and draw
salary are subject to executive branch controls as well as pan-govern-
ment restrictions such as the Ethics in Government and Hatch Acts.
Indeed, officers also are subject to impeachment. We are confident that,
for such individuals, adequate accountability is maintained.
The difficulty is that lines between government and non-govern-
mental entities and individuals have become so blurred. The potential
arrays of public and private attributes seem limitless. After the first year
of the Obama Administration, the federal government owned sixty-one
percent of General Motors 2 5 0-should that make General Motors' Board
of Directors public or private? Indeed, the Obama Administration pres-
sured the CEO of General Motors to resign.2 5 ' President Obama's
249. Statement on Signing S. 209 into Law, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1424 (Oct. 28,
1996).
250. David Welch & Michael Tsang, GM Files for IPO That Will Reduce Treasury's Stake,
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 18, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-18/general-motors-files-
for-ipo-that-will-reduce-treasury-s-stake.html.
251. Mike Allen & Josh Gerstein, GM CEO Resigns at Obama's Behest, PoLMco, Mar. 29,
2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0309/20625.html.
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Administration recently supported a critical role for the National Acad-
emy of Sciences in the global warming debate, even though Academy
members are neither appointed by the President nor subject to his
removal authority. Would the Academy's involvement be considered
public because it is working pursuant to a congressional scheme to
reduce global warming even if the vast majority of its responsibilities
had nothing to do with implementation of federal law? Members of the
PCAOB, NAS, and Kenneth Feinberg all boast some attributes of public
authority, and yet lack others. Feinberg did not enjoy a full-time govern-
ment job and may not have been subject to government-wide ethics and
conflict of interest restrictions.252 On the other hand, the PCAOB's
members were appointed by the SEC and work full-time, though the
group is exempt from FOIA and its budget is drawn from a "tax" on the
accountants it regulates.253 Private contractors, in turn, are paid from
taxpayer dollars, yet not directly through the government. They are
employed by private entities even when working full time on govern-
ment projects.
There are any number of ways to ascertain when the entity or indi-
vidual exercising power should be considered a part of our government
structure and thus capable constitutionally of exercising decisional
authority. Courts could focus on the formal trappings of office such as
salary and oath of office, the intent of the delegator, or on whether the
individual or group is bound by the principal bureaucratic checks operat-
ing on the vast majority of federal governmental employees. This sec-
tion considers the salience of each factor by itself, and concludes that
individuals and groups should be able to exercise decisional authority
when they are formally "public," or when the individual or group acts
within the vortex of governmental checks and balances. Conventionally
understood labels should not be dispositive.
a. Salary
As an initial matter, consider the question of salary. Those individ-
uals paid by the federal government should be treated as public employ-
ees, and are. The commitment of salary reflects a link between the
individual and the government, and broadcasts that tasks accomplished
pursuant to that salary further governmental goals.
Yet, the opposite is not true. Individuals and groups have worked to
implement federal law without a salary. Members of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences would not receive compensation for their involvement
252. See supra note 3 for a discussion of Feinberg's appointment.
253. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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in global warming. Numerous individuals have served as envoys over-
seas without pay, bargaining over treaty conditions and seeking the
release of citizens imprisoned abroad. 2 54 The mining groups in Carter v.
Carter Coal Co. drew no salary for their efforts in setting working con-
ditions. Salary as an indicator of public status is underinclusive. Individ-
uals and groups long have wielded substantial authority under the laws
of the United States without pay.
Moreover, there is something circular about the salary issue. When
the government pays an individual through an intermediary, as under a
contract or grant, the fact that the pay and specifications come from the
federal government does not transform that individual from a private to
a public actor. The origin of the salary, in other words, is not dispositive
in determining which actors should be considered public.
b. Congressional or Presidential Labeling
Furthermore, there seems little reason to defer in full to the label
affixed by either Congress or the President. If we are distrustful of dele-
gations to private entities by the heads of Article I and H, then courts
should be able to probe beneath whatever title Congress or the President
chooses. The Supreme Court in Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp.2 55 held that congressional labels should be jettisoned: a congres-
sional label of "corporation does not alter [the entity's] characteristics so
as to make something other than what it actually is . . . ."256 The Court
concluded that, "[i]f Amtrak is, by its very nature, what the Constitution
regards as the Government, congressional pronouncement that it is not
such can no more relieve it of its First Amendment restrictions than a
similar pronouncement could exempt the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion from the Fourth Amendment."257
In the PCAOB example itself, Congress determined that the
PCAOB should be considered private. Neither the executive branch nor
the Court deferred to that assessment. Congress presumably cannot be
trusted to determine which of its delegates should be considered private,
because it otherwise could too readily circumvent constitutional con-
straints on its action.
Closely connected to the labeling is the question of presidential or
congressional selection. To some, the very fact of presidential selection
transforms a private individual into a public servant. The designation of
an individual or group by the President or Congress arguably signals that
254. For an example of envoys dispersed to negotiate treaties, see Yoo, supra note 9.
255. 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
256. Id. at 393.
257. Id. at 392.
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the individual or entity is to be considered public, and all that the actor
does in that capacity should similarly be subject to public scrutiny. If the
Appointments Clause is followed, that surely is the case. Every individ-
ual appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause should be considered
public and can exercise authority delegated from Congress. And, given
that the power to remove flows from the power to appoint, potential
exercise of the removal authority adds a check on the duties exercised by
the presidential delegate. Public appointment and the potential for
removal ensure some accountability for the delegate's exercise of
responsibility. Presidential appointment and removal (whether direct or
indirect as in the PCAOB case itself), therefore, can determine public
status.
But the fact of presidential involvement in the selection of an indi-
vidual should not automatically ensure that the individual or group
designated can exercise decisional authority. Congress, after all, dis-
charges an analogous function when it delegates to private parties as
would be the case under the global warming bill. A congressional direc-
tion to the Cato Institute to exercise a particular function should be no
more talismanic than the Obama Administration's direction to Kenneth
Feinberg to perform certain functions. By his actions, President Obama
has manifested his intent that Feinberg's nomination (via the Secretary
of the Treasury) need not be presented to the Senate for its approval.
Whether the administration decided that Feinberg retained his private
status, or that the duties exercised were not "significant" under Buckley
v. Valeo (or, for that matter, whether Congress implicitly had sanctioned
the appointment), is beside the point. If courts are to police delegations
to preserve individual liberty, the fact of presidential selection should
not be determinative. That designation may not sufficiently link the
delegate's actions in the public eye to the designating entity. Indeed, all
contracting out determinations reflect the executive branch's designation
of particular individuals (or, more likely, firms) to perform specified
functions. Neither presidential nor congressional involvement in the des-
ignation of the individual or entity implementing federal law suffices to
confer public status.
Consider, as well, Congress's creation of the United States Railway
Association to monitor CONRAIL and issue bonds, among other
duties.25 8 In so doing, Congress provided that a majority of the entity's
members were to be drawn from lists of private individuals supplied by
the AFL-CIO and Association of American Railroads. 59 Again, no sal-
258. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 45 U.S.C.).
259. Id. § 201(d), 45 U.S.C. § 711(d).
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ary was to be paid, and the private members were not to be subject to the
regulations circumscribing the conduct of most government officials.
Both Congress and the President shared in the process to appoint the
officials, but that selection should not, without more, transform the des-
ignee into a public official.
Moreover, despite the selection, a private group may wield the
removal authority, solely or concurrently with the President. For
instance, consider a congressional bill that would have set up an IRS
Oversight Board, under which the President was to appoint to the multi-
member Board a representative of the Internal Revenue Service employ-
ees. Once a representative of the Internal Revenue Service employees
was terminated from "membership, or other affiliation with the organi-
zation" he or she would be removed from the Board.260 The existence of
the removal authority wielded by the private entity raises the question of
the representative's status-he or she would be beholden both to the
President and the private employee group. Thus, although presidential
selection combined with removal strongly signals public status, selection
by itself may not be sufficient.
Finally, the appointment and removal powers of the President at
times are not at issue. Some individuals or groups may implement fed-
eral law and yet hold no federal office. As mentioned previously, Buck-
ley suggests that "offices" are reserved for individuals who implement
federal law over a sustained period of time. Members of the National
Academy of Sciences might be implementing federal authority even if
they do not hold federal office, and the same would have been true for
the miners in Carter Coal. The key, therefore, is to consider whether
other indicia of public status exist even when there is no formal presi-
dential appointment and removal.
c. Public Accountability System
One powerful indicator of public status exists in the individual or
entity's conformance to the welter of rules and regulations that are
designed to make governmental actors' decisions public regarding.
Although these government-wide restraints do not rise to a constitutional
level, their applicability has salience in ascertaining whether the individ-
uals or groups involved may, consistent with the Constitution, exercise
decisional authority.
For instance, nearly all governmental entities must comply with the
260. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1997, H.R. 2676, 105th Cong.
§ 7802(b)(4)(C) (1997). The structure of the FOMC is similar, permitting changes in committee
composition based on removals initiated by private parties.
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disclosure requirement of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).261
Records generated by the entity, whether communicated in writing or
electronically, must be subject to perusal by the public, with limited
exceptions. Indeed, it was not until the Obama Administration
responded to a FOIA request that it came to light that Feinberg, despite
press reports to the contrary, received a salary for his role as Compensa-
tion Czar.262 The Sunshine Act as well ensures that meetings of govern-
mental officials are open to the public, and in that way furthers
transparency. 263 Moreover, the Ethics in Government Act264 and Hatch
Act265 impose conflict of interest rules on senior governmental officials,
including limitations on self dealing.
More particularly, there are prohibitions to prevent governmental
employees from using their positions to enhance their personal finances,
including restrictions on receiving gifts. 266 Additionally, government
employees are prohibited from using their public office to advance pri-
vate interests beyond the purely financial, such as political, familial, or
other private purposes.267
Governmental employees also face restrictions on their non-work
activities, including outside activities and post-government employment.
For example, outside of work, employees may not represent268 or serve
as an expert witness for third parties 269 in disputes involving the govern-
ment, be awarded a government contract,270 or be compensated for
teaching, speaking, or writing.27' After leaving the government, execu-
tive branch and certain other agency employees are prohibited from
communicating with current officials about particular matters. This pro-
hibition is permanent if the employee personally and substantially
worked on the matter and lasts for two years if the matter was only
pending when the employee worked for the government.272
Depending on the employee's level of employment, the restrictions
261. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
262. Supra note 77.
263. Government in the Sunshine Act (Open Meetings Act), 5 U.S.C § 552b (2006).
264. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, and
28 U.S.C.).
265. 5 U.S.C. § 7321-26 (2006).
266. Id. § 7342 (gifts from foreign governments); Id. § 7353 (gifts from subordinates). I am
indebted to Kathleen Clark for her excellent summary of the restrictions on federal governmental
employees. Clark, supra note 7, 27-28.
267. See 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(1) (2006) (prohibiting using government position to influence an
election); Id. § 3110 (hiring relatives); 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702 (2010) (other private purposes).
268. 18 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205 (2006).
269. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.805 (2010).
270. 48 C.F.R. § 3.601 (2010).
271. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.807 (2010).
272. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2006).
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imposed vary in complexity and severity. For example, high-level offi-
cials are subject to additional restrictions on compensation for outside
activities, 273  outside income,2 74  and post-employment activities,
enforced by the possibility of criminal penalties.27 While still subject to
some of the restrictions that apply to other government employees, tem-
porary employees are not subject to other restrictions276 or are subject to
them in a narrower range of circumstances. 2 77 Taken as a whole, these
government-wide restrictions define what it means to be a public
employee.
No similar constraints operate on private parties.27 8 Private parties
need not respond to requests for information, need not comply with the
conflict of interest rules specified under the Ethics in Government Act
and, depending on contract, can leave their employment and work for a
competitor at any time. Thus, when Congress or the President delegates
authority to individuals who are not subject to these limitations, those
delegates are acting akin to private parties.
By contract or grant, the executive branch at times imposes similar
constraints upon private contractors. If contractors must disclose infor-
mation in their possession upon the request of any citizen, must conduct
meetings in the open, cannot lobby on certain issues, and work only via
government specification, then they more likely should be treated as
public entities for purposes of exercising delegated authority. Imposition
of the contractual requirements-like those stemming from government-
wide regulations-may lead to a finding of public status.
For instance, consider contracting out by the Bureau of Prisons for
management personnel. Solicitations require that "[a]ll services and pro-
grams shall comply with . . . the U.S. Constitution; all applicable fed-
eral, state and local laws and regulations; applicable Presidential
273. See Exec. Order No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 21, 2009) (prohibiting appointees
from accepting lobbyist gifts).
274. 5 C.F.R. 2635.804(a) (2010) (prohibiting presidential appointees from receiving "outside
earned income for outside employment, or for any other outside activity.")
275. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2006) (imposing criminal liability on former executive and legislative
branch officers and employees who participate in trade negotiations or attempt to influence
officers or employees in the department or agency where he or she works within a one or two-year
period).
276. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 2635.807(a)(2)(i)(E)(4) (2010) (exempting temporary employees
from the prohibition on compensation for teaching, as long as they serve for less than sixty days or
the subject is general or concerns ongoing policy or programs.)
277. For example, the criminal statute on salary supplementation only applies if the temporary
employee is paid by the government. 18 U.S.C. § 209(c) (2006).
278. Some states have made the decision to contract out itself subject to notice and comment
rulemaking (or other oversight), but not the subsequent decisions and policymaking carried out by
the private parties. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and Democracy: Resources in
Administrative Law, in GOVERNMENT BY CoNnRACT, supra note 84, at 261, 280-83.
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Executive Orders (E.O.); all applicable case law; and Court Orders."27 9
By contract, therefore, the Bureau of Prisons arguably has transformed
private contractors into public employees, at least for purposes of the
delegation inquiry.280
Similarly, when contracting out for debt collection, the Department
of Education (among others) requires that the private contractors must
obey the Privacy Act and follow the Federal Claims Collections Stan-
dards and the Department's debt collection regulation.28 1 In addition, the
Department must approve debt collection letters.282 Again, via contract,
the Department of Education in part changed the character of its
agents-they were no longer exempt from certain government-wide reg-
ulations.28 3 Such constraints in a close case should legitimate the con-
tracting out decision, even if decisional authority is included. 2 8 4
Justification for this approach stems from the key constitutional cri-
terion of accountability. Delegation of decisional authority should be
permitted to entities that are publicly accountable. Although the chain of
command may still be blurred, the presence of such government-wide
constraints serves as a proxy. For example, we are more assured that
private contractors implement the will of executive branch officials
when they must respond to FOIA, comply with the Hatch Act, and so
forth. Contractors who must adhere to government-wide controls are, at
least on the margin, subject to greater oversight and their conduct can be
traced by the public more readily to the executive branch officials dele-
gating the authority.
In sum, determining when Congress or the President impermissibly
has delegated decisional authority to a private actor can be complex.
There should be no dispute in the vast majority of circumstances.
Receipt of salary indicates public status, permitting the delegation,
although the converse is not true. Moreover, congressional or presiden-
tial labeling should not be determinative. If the public status is not clear,
the key to upholding a delegation of decisional authority should turn on
279. Kelman, supra note 84, at 183, 435 n.104 (quoting "boilerplate language" from a Bureau
of Prisons management contract with a general contractor).
280. In the wake of the spate of bank bailouts in the early 1990s, Congress provided that any
FDIC contract employee should be deemed a government employee for purposes of government
ethics statutes and regulations. 12 U.S.C. § 1822(f) (2006).
281. Kelman, supra note 84, at 184.
282. Id.
283. A select number of ethics statutes currently apply to government employees and contracts
alike, such as criminal prohibition on disclosure of sensitive procurement information. 41 U.S.C.
§ 423 (2006).
284. In a sense, the Supreme Court has followed an analogous route in holding that
constitutional guarantees should attach at times no matter whether the actor is private or public.
Some type of public accountability must attach to the discharge of certain functions, irrespective
of form or label.
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whether the individual or entity must comply with the unique sets of
constraints, such as FOIA and the Ethics in Government Act, that help
define what it means to work in the public sector.2 85 Distinguishing pub-
lic from private status in the abstract is not critical.
Courts therefore can formulate doctrine distinguishing those exer-
cises of governmental powers by private entities and individuals that
violate the Constitution. By articulating a test to determine what level of
authority exercised by private groups is constitutionally problematic,
and by determining when individuals and groups are sufficiently con-
strained by government checks, a workable test can be devised. Unlike
in the nondelegation context, a doctrinal test can be applied without
intruding too far into the prerogatives of the coordinate branch of gov-
ernment. That test can demarcate permissible from impermissible dele-
gations of authority to private parties and serve as a continual reminder
of the limits in the Constitution on the exercise of power by private
entities.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Obama Administration likely will continue to rely upon private
individuals and entities in governing the country. Integrating the private
sector into government can ensure greater expertise and efficiency in
managing the public sector and, at the same time, garner support from
regulated entities. Nonetheless, the Constitution does not authorize pri-
vate parties to exercise decisional authority over their peers. The interest
in accountability presupposes that only publicly responsible entities
affect the legal rights of private parties. Although the Supreme Court's
prior doctrinal lenses-Due Process, nondelegation doctrine, and Article
II-reflect a first step, they have distorted the constitutional principle at
stake. Courts instead should scrutinize such delegations more directly to
prevent private parties from exercising decisional authority over others.
They should ask first whether the quantum of authority exercised rises to
the level of decisional authority and, if so, whether the entity exercising
that authority should be considered private, in part due to the absence of
government-wide constraints imposed on public employees such as
FOIA and the Ethics in Government Act. Recognizing this constitutional
limitation on delegations to private parties will ensure that "[o]ne can
have a government . .. that benefits from expertise without being ruled
by experts."286
285. Viewed with another lens, the focus on compliance with government-wide rules and
regulations dovetails with other academics' stress on the need to ensure that private parties remain
accountable for their exercise of delegated authority. See Metzger, supra note 1; Aman, supra note
278.
286. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156 (2010).
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